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TAX LIABILITY AND INARBITRABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
THOMAS E. CARBoNNEAU*
AND ANDREW W.

I.

SHELDRICK**

INTRODUCTION

THE U.S. Supreme Court's case law on the arbitrability of claims
has undermined the central function of the inarbitrability defense.
The combined effect of the holdings in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.'
and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,2 on
the international side, along with Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v.
McMahon,3 Rodriguez de Qui/as v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,4 and Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,' on the domestic

side, has been to eliminate any identifiable boundary between the
realm of contract and the domain of regulatory law, between private
mercantile interests and the public interest of nation-states. The U.S.
Supreme Court's position on the inarbitrability defense is influencing
other jurisdictions to consider an equally unrestrictive view on the
matter. 6 This evolution in the law of arbitrability seems to sustain the
necessary autonomy of international arbitration and commerce, but
also, it amounts to a misguided redefinition of the mission and func7
tion of arbitral adjudication.
* Professor of Law and Director, Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law, Tulane
University School of Law. Diplome, Universite de Poitiers; A.B., Bowdoin College; M.A., Oxford University; M.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., S.J.D., Columbia University.
**
Member of the Bars of New York and England; M.A., University of Cambridge;
M.C.L., George Washington University; practicing law with Briger & Associates, New York.
1. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
2. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
3. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
4. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
6. On January 27, 1992, the French Committee on Arbitration held a conference on the
topic of "Perspectives of Evolution in the French Law of Arbitration" in which major French
experts in arbitration debated the continued viability of the inarbitrability defense. The proceedings of the conference will be published in La Revue de L'Arbitrage (forthcoming June 1992).
Pierre Bellet, formerly Chief Judge of the French Court of Cassation and an organizer of the
conference, appears to have advocated for aligning the French law of arbitrabiIity with the developments in U.S. federal law. Although a progressive attitude toward international commerce
in some respects, such a position deviates from the traditional commerce civilian approach to
this issue.
7. For a thorough discussion of this development, see Richard E. Speidel, Arbitrationof
Statutory Rights Under the FederalArbitrationAct: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. REsOL. 157 (1989).
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This essay engages in a narrow but crucial inquiry into the limits the
inarbitrability defense may now impose upon the exercise of arbitral
jurisdiction. While it is assumed that matters relating directly to status
and capacity, testamentary dispositions, and title to immovable property fall outside the jurisdictional reach of international arbitrators,
the question becomes whether any national regulatory laws, such as
tax laws, benefit from the same status of inviolability.
The issue is far from abstract. The applicability of tax law and the
allocation of its burden may significantly affect the economic viability
of a contract for one or possibly both parties. However, with the increasing complexity of national tax laws, particularly as applied to international transactions, it is no longer practical to expect the parties
fully to anticipate the impact of current legislation, let alone future
enactments. In certain areas, such as financial products, tax law is
unable to keep pace with developments in the market, thereby adding
to the uncertainty.
The following hypothetical facts illustrate the problem with greater
particularity. Assume a Japanese company licenses a patent to a U.S.
manufacturer located in New Jersey; the companies enjoy successful
commercial dealings for several years. Sometime thereafter, the U.S.
Congress enacts an additional withholding tax on certain classes of
royalty payment. The tax arguably applies to the payments being
made by the New Jersey entity. The New Jersey company notifies the
Japanese party of its intention to withhold the additional tax. The
Japanese company refuses to accept any deduction, arguing that the
new tax does not apply and, even were it applicable, it should be the
responsibility of the payor. The New Jersey company cancels the contract pursuant to a "bad faith dealings" provision in the contract.
The Japanese company then invokes the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) arbitration clause contained in the contract, alleging
an unjustifiable breach. The New Jersey party counters that the issue
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). Furthermore, the New Jersey company requests that the arbitral tribunal stay the arbitration until the IRS or a
federal court has ruled dispositively on the applicability of the tax.
Should the tax law matter, inextricably linked to the would-be contract breach, be deemed inarbitrable and lead to a stay of the arbitration proceedings?
Throughout the following discussion, the U.S. law on arbitration
and arbitrability is compared and contrasted to its French counterpart. Prior to the recent surge in arbitration cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, 8 the French law of arbitration was perhaps the most
8.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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liberal and advanced national law on arbitration. 9 It also appeared to
maintain a sensible balance between the juridical order and the arbitral process, and a necessary distinction between the application of
arbitral principles in matters of domestic and international commerce. 10 Finally, the discipline of the civilian edifice for the law left
little doubt about the domain of the non-judicial process even in the
context of international commerce. The contradistinctive French and
American approaches illustrate not only the indeterminacy of solution
to the problem posed by the hypothetical case, but also the significance of the problem to the integrity of arbitration law.

II.

ARBITRATION GENERALLY

A well-settled principle of arbitration law is that arbitral tribunals,
whether domestic or international, have the authority and right to rule
upon challenges made to their jurisdictional capacity. As stated in Article 1466 of the French Code of Civil Procedure," an arbitral tribunal
may-pursuant to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine, 12 rule upon a
claim that the arbitration agreement is invalid or that the issues submitted to arbitration fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. The conferral of such court-like powers upon arbitral tribunals
is seen as necessary to protect arbitral proceedings from dilatory tactics and thereby preserve the adjudicatory autonomy of the arbitral
process. Otherwise, parties whose interests were antagonistic to arbitration would attempt to delay the process by compelling court action
on jurisdictional issues.'
It should be underscored, however, that Kompetenz-Kompetenz
and other doctrines 14 establishing the autonomy of the arbitral process
do not alter the basic mission of arbitration which is to serve as a
mechanism for resolving contractual disputes. Furthermore, these

9. THoMAs E.
10.
11.

CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Id. at 71.
Code de procedure civile [C.

PR.

68-72 (1989).

crw.] art. 1466 (Fr.).

12. Expressed variously as compktence sur la competence or jurisdiction on jurisdiction,
this concept describes the arbitral's authority to rule on jurisdictional challenges; this is a wellsettled principle of arbitration law. See J.AN ROBERT, L'ARBnTRAGE DROIT INTERNE DRorr INTERNATIONAL ParvE (1983). It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is noticeably absent from the U.S. law of arbitration. Under section three of the Federal
Arbitration Act, a court must decide whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, thereby allowing non-complying parties to delay the arbitration for six months to a year. 9 U.S.C. § 3

(1988).
13. See generally RErE DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANs LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1982);
ROBERT, supra note 12.

14.

One example is the separability doctrine under which the invalidity of the main contract

does not necessarily affect the validity of the arbitral clause. See also supra note 12.
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doctrines do not eliminate all legal restrictions upon the recourse to
and exercise of arbitral justice. Indeed, under French law 5 and the
1958 New York Arbitration Convention, 6 the inarbitrability defense
and the public policy exception are vital and indispensable legal barriers to an untoward expansion or assertion of arbitral jurisdiction. Article 2060 of the French Civil Code17 provides: "One cannot agree to
arbitrate matters of the status and capacity of persons, those relating
to divorce and separation, or disputes involving public entities and esand more generally on all matters touching public poltablishments,
18
icy."
Article II(1) and Article V(2)(a), (b) of the New York Convention
provide:
Article II
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 9
Article V
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
award would be
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the
20
country.
that
of
policy
public
the
to
contrary
III.

CONTRACTUAL BORDER OF ARBrrATION

As represented by French law, the origin and culmination of arbitral jurisdiction is anchored in the right of contract. Arbitration is a

15. See Bernard Audit, A National Codification of InternationalCommercial Arbitration:
The French Decree of May 12, 1981, in RESOLViNG TRANSNATIONAL DisPuras THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION 117 (Sixth Sokol Colloquium, Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1984); C~ARBONNEAU, supra note 9; ROBERT, supra note 12.
16. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)) [hereinafter New
York Convention]. See generally ALBERT VAN DEN BERG, THE NEw YoRK ARBITRATION CONVENTION oF 1958 (1981).
17. CODE crvT. [C. crv.] art. 2060 (Fr.).
18. See id.; 22 J.O. 10190(1), 1986 D.S.L. 444 (repealing part relating to public entities).
19. New York Convention, supranote 16.
20. Id.
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legitimate exercise of contractual freedom to establish a private form
of justice and adjudication. Moreover, when freely entered into by
parties of equal position, arbitration can be used to solve problems of
contractual performance, breach, and interpretation.
As a standard part of arbitration law, the inarbitrability defense reinforces the fundamentally contractual character of the arbitral process. It provides that non-contractual issues, regardless of their
implications for the transaction, cannot be submitted to arbitration
because they impinge upon or involve directly matters of public law.
By its very conception in the French Code, arbitration is seen as a
product and tool of contract, as inapplicable to claims generated by
regulatory law. The specific enumeration contained in Article 206021
(referring to the status and capacity of persons), when read in pari
materia with the broad language of Article 205922 (referring to rights
that persons freely dispose), demonstrates that inarbitrability appears
to cover a broad range of rights created by statute to protect classes of
persons and to safeguard the public interest.
It is difficult to picture how the regulation of arbitration could be
otherwise. Arbitration must be protected from judicial interference to
maintain its integrity as a process for resolving contractual disputes.
However, its principal adjudicatory features make it entirely inapposite as a mechanism for resolving claims involving important social
issues. These issues arise from statutes meant to reflect a societal consensus, to eradicate general social problems, or to protect disadvantaged parties. Arbitral justice is completely private; its decisions are
never subject to a substantive review or appeal; and arbitrators are
accountable basically to no one but the contracting parties. The public
discussion and information, so vital to the content and effect of regulatory statutes, and to the norms they eventually generate, are completely absent from arbitration.
As a civil law statutory enactment, the French law on arbitration is
comprehensive and thorough; it serves as a model law on arbitration
in many parts of the civil law world. Nonetheless, it is a national law
designed to regulate arbitrations that come solely within the orbit of
French jurisdiction. However, the inarbitrability defense and public
policy exception have been made a functional part of the international
arbitral process through the provisions of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention.23 A signatory state is not obligated to enforce arbitration agreements or awards when they violate its public policy or

21.
22.
23.

C. civ. art. 2060 (Fr.).
C. civ. art. 2059 (Fr.).
See New York Convention, supra note 16, art. V(2)(a), (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520.
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24
pertain to a subject matter deemed inarbitrable under its law. French
law on international arbitration endorses this reference to national law
by recognizing the application of the public policy exception, while
adapting it to the particular context of application by referring to
"French internationalpublic policy."' z Presumably, a foreign or an
international arbitral award would be unenforceable in France if it
dealt with an inarbitrable subject matter under French law, i.e., a
matter covered by vital French regulatory statutes or ordrepublic.
In any event, the inarbitrability defense and other legal restrictions
on the jurisdictional scope of arbitration are a recognized and functional part of the French civil law on arbitration and of the U.N.
"universal charter" on international arbitration. The precise content
of either restriction appears difficult to define (although clearly an arbitral award pronouncing a divorce between French parties or disposing of a French decedent's estate would be unenforceable in France).
The general and most meaningful guide is the contractual rights restriction on Article 2059. Parties can agree to arbitrate those rights
validly born of contract, but presumably not those conferred by the
state through statutes or involving the public interest.

IV.

THE EXPANDED

SCOPE OF ARBITRAL JURISDICTION

UNDER U.S. LAW

The statutory form of the American law of arbitration is less systematic and organized than its French analogue. 26 The U.S. Arbitration Act of 1925 (the "Act") contains no reference to either the
inarbitrability defense or the public policy exception.27 The grounds
for the judicial supervision of awards is less complete than those contained either in French law or in the New York Convention. Section
two of the Act contains only an oblique reference to the contractual
character of arbitration.2 In this regard, the Act is typical of the traditional distinction between common law and civil law statutory enactments in that the federal statute has a meager regulatory scope and
leaves much of its content to be elaborated subsequently through case
law. 29
In fact, the case law accompanying the American statute has added
significantly to the content of the federal legislation. The federal
24. Id.
25. See CARBONNEAU, supra text accompanying note 9.

26. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 9,at 105-6.
27. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925)(current version at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988)).
28. Id.at §2.
29. See generallyCARBoNNEAu, supra note 9,at 107-39.
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courts have created a "strong [and emphatic] federal policy favoring
arbitration." 3 0 The separability doctrine is a product of judicial construction." Moreover, the courts have recognized a common law public policy exception, but limited its application essentially to labor
arbitrations3 2 Finally, decisions pertaining to inarbitrability have only
dealt with defining circumstances in which the defense is inapplicable.33 The initial cases involved matters of international arbitration;
subsequent cases have eradicated any distinction between international
and domestic arbitration and proclaimed a rule of broad application
4
of arbitrability for all forms of disputes.
Under American law, regulatory disputes or statutory claims that
attend contracts containing an arbitration clause can be submitted to
arbitration. Specifically, courts have held the following matters arbitrable under U.S. law: antitrust disputes,3 5 claims arising under the
1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, 36 civil
violations of RICO, 37 and age discrimination claims. 38 Moreover, a
39
bankruptcy proceeding will not impede the reference to arbitration.
Congressional legislation allowing the arbitration of patent disputes
and the enactment of the two sections fifteen of the U.S. Arbitration
Act4° appear to lend Congressional support for and approval of the

30. Id. at 110-14.
31. Id. at 107-10.
32. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitrationand the U.S. Supreme Court: A Pleafor
Statutory Reform, 501mo ST. J. oN Dxsp. RESOL. 231 (1990); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau,
The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME.L. REv. 269 n.27 (1988).
33. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
34. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
35. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
36. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
37. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232-33.
38. Amulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92, 775 (1986),
rev'd, 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988).
39. Sonatrach v. Distrigas Corp., No. 86-2014-Y (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 1987).
40. 9 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (1988). There were two sections enacted in 1988 with the number 15.
The present one, on the Act of State doctrine, remains § 15. A 1990 amendment separated the
second one, on appeals, and makes it § 16:
§ 15. Inapplicability of the Act of State doctrine.
Enforcement of arbitra agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution
upon judgments based on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the
basis of the Act of State doctrine.
§ 16. Appeals.
(a) An appeal may be taken from(1) an order(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
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work of the federal courts in the area of arbitration. The chief motivation for the judicial liberality in regard to arbitration appears to lie
less in an understanding of the arbitral process than in a desire to
clear the federal dockets and achieve efficient factual judicial management.
Notwithstanding the problems the federal court position on arbitration portends for the U.S. legal system, it remains unclear whether
any subject areas are inarbitrable under U.S. law. It is also unclear
what influence the American position should have upon international
arbitration practice. However it is gauged ultimately, the U.S. position ignores the contractual origin and mission of the arbitral process
and, as a consequence, restricts and perhaps eliminates a vital institutional and definitional barrier between the legal system and arbitration. Federal court enthusiasm for unfettered arbitration is expressly
founded upon the mistaken view that any legal restriction of arbitration is tantamount to judicial hostility. Historically, the success of arbitration in specialized areas has been linked to its adjudicatory
attributes: the provision of expertise, neutrality, privacy, flexibility,
and finality. None of these attributes are as functional in the context
of adjudicating regulatory disputes. In fact, some of them may be
contraindicated.
Justice Stevens' dissents in several of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions on arbitrability illustrate the magnitude of the Court's misunderstanding of the process and attest to the dangers of overweening
arbitral jurisdiction. 41 Arbitration is not a "formula for world peace;"
it has its primary application in matters of contract. As to international arbitration specifically, Professor Hans Smit, 42 an authority in
the area and himself an international arbitrator, has strongly argued
that the virtual elimination of the inarbitrability defense in Mitsubishi
and the extension of arbitral jurisdiction to include statutory claims

(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an

arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be
taken from an interlocutory order(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
41. See CARBoNNEAu, supranote 9, at 294-297.

42. Fuld Professor of Law and Director, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law,
Columbia University.
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could significantly hinder the arbitration of international contract
claims. Smit recognizes that international arbitrators are not judges
vested with the political authority to guard a national public interest;
they are commercial experts whose task is to discover and implement
commercial justice in disrupted transactions. The incorporation of
regulatory claims arising under national law into international arbitral
jurisdiction simply exceeds the rationale for the process and is likely
43
to frustrate its functional operation and underlying gravamen.
However, other international experts have endorsed the emerging
hegemony of arbitration. 44 They have argued variously that: claims of
national statutory violations could be an attempt to delay the day of
reckoning; international arbitrators are often distinguished jurists,
able to acquaint themselves with and understand foreign statutory
law; and bifurcating issues or staying arbitral proceedings might reduce the general efficacy of international arbitration. It is further argued that a commercial divorce is as unpleasant and as contentious as
its personal counterpart and requires a unitary tribunal that can rule
upon all the relevant issues.
V.

A

CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATION

None of these arguments carries the weight of conviction. They sustain a perspective on arbitral jurisdiction that privileges the factor of

functionality and ignores the fundamental issue of legitimacy. Working together, courts and arbitral tribunals could surely unmask the
specious statutory claim. The resolution of regulatory disputes involves not only jural and commercial expertise, but also the exercise
of political judgment and the making of value choices. International
arbitrators, often alien to the political culture that gave rise to the
enabling statutes, would not in a larger sense be accountable for the

choices they make. Finally, international commercial arbitrations are
no longer simple and efficient proceedings. The formality and complexity of ordinary litigation practices have begun to inform the arbi-

tral trial. Increasing sophistication could well command the reference
of certain claims to another, more appropriate forum for decision.
To some extent in both domestic and international arbitrations, the
issue of arbitrability is parallel to the question of whether arbitrators

43. Hans Smit, Mitsubishi:It Is Not What It Seems To Be, 4 J. INT'L AiR. 7 (1987).
44. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi Case: Another View, 2 ARB. INT1'L 178
(1986); William W. Park, NationalLaw and CommercialJustice: SafeguardingJudicialIntegrity

in InternationalArbitration,63 T-.. L. Ray. 647 (1989).
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4
can award extraordinary relief in the form of punitive damages.
Both problems implicate the contractual character of arbitration and
illustrate the tendency to expand the reach of arbitral jurisdiction. The
basic rule under U.S. law is that arbitrators may award punitive damages provided they are authorized to do so specifically in the arbitration agreement. 46 In other words, unless the parties to the arbitration
agree to an exceptional grant of authority, the awarding of non-contractual relief is prohibited in arbitration because the arbitrators have
a purely contractual authority. The rule intermediates between the
concern for the legitimacy of arbitration and the popular trend of expanding willy-nilly the province of arbitral jurisdiction. It remains difficult to reconcile even this moderate rule with the civil law view that
the parties' right to arbitrate is circumscribed to the legal rights over
which they have free legal disposition. Granted exceptionally by
courts, punitive damages have always been seen as a type of public
law sanction and emanating from the judiciary's sovereign political
authority to impose legal penalties upon particularly egregious individual behavior. 47
A similar rule could be adopted for purposes of resolving the arbitrability question. When a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, arbitrators would have jurisdiction to rule upon contractual disputes falling
within the scope of the submission to arbitration. Non-contractual
claims, such as those arising from national statutes, could not be submitted to arbitration unless the parties in their agreement specifically
authorized the arbitrators to rule upon such issues. In fact, the reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on arbitrability, national and
international, is likely to include a more careful drafting of arbitration
agreements, the avoidance of standard clauses, and a specific or relatively specific determination of the extent of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction as to damages and subject matter jurisdiction.
The removal of arbitrability determinations from the purview of
courts and arbitral tribunals and their placement within the contractual bargaining authority of the parties makes contract negotiations
and deal-making more onerous, but, on the other hand, allows some
leeway for imposing necessary restrictions, albeit purely transactional,
upon the exercise of arbitral subject matter jurisdiction. The integration of such a rule into international arbitral practice would be part of

45. Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 831 (1976). See CAoNNEnu, supra note 9, at 292294. But see PunitivesNot Available in N. Y. Arbitration, 6 INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (Nov. 1991).
46. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala.
1984); see also CARBONNEAU, supranote 9, at 292-294.
47. See CARBoNNEAu, supra note 9, at 292.
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a general trend toward privatizing many aspects of transnational commerce and toward having the exercise of contractual freedom replace
the usual role of conflict of laws. Such a development has been in
evidence for some time in international arbitration and is now surfacing in the context of the extraterritorial application of securities
48
laws .

VI.

A FURTHER

CRITIQUE

As applied to the circumstances of the hypothetical case involving
the Japanese and New Jersey companies, this rule argues for a stay of
the arbitral proceeding pending action by the U.S. tax courts or tax
agency, provided the arbitral tribunal deemed the issue of tax liability
to be material to the resolution of the contractual issues. In their arbitration agreement, the parties did not authorize the arbitrators specifically to rule on regulatory or non-contractual claims that surfaced in
the transaction. Such a determination would pay due heed to the party
autonomy principle and to the contractual nature of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional investiture.
However, despite its salutary results, such a solution is too muffled
and evasive a response to the central problem posed by the arbitrability issue in this case. No matter how successful and essential international arbitration may have been to transnational commerce, it cannot
derogate from all aspects of national law. National sovereignty and its
acquiescence to private adjudication remain indispensable to the legitimacy and continued vitality of arbitration. It is one thing to allow
contracting parties to create their own justice systems to resolve their
private contractual disputes and to permit arbitrators to rule as amiable compositeurs49 and generally to fabricate a new law merchant on a
completely ad hoc and de facto basis.50 It is quite another matter to
eradicate completely the relevance of national law in the international
arbitral process and to allow a purely private form of adjudication,
which is not accountable to national legal communities, to interpret
and implement mandatory provisions of national public law. The
point is simple: national regulatory law, imbued with political content

48. See Michael P. Malloy, Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 12 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 103 (1987) (book review); see also J. Arthur Urciuoli, Major Markets and Financing

Mechanisms, in

FnAcIo IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS SEVENTH ANNuAL FOR-

DHAM CORPORATE INSTITrT 18-20 (Howard T. Sprow, ed., 1980).
49. See E. LoQuiN, L'Am.iAB
COMoSIoN EN DROIT CoMPARE ET INTERNATIONAL: CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DU NoN-DRorr DANS L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL (1980); see also JEAN ROBERT & THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION § 6.02 (1983).
50. For a thorough discussion of the development of modern lex mercatoria, see generally
LEx MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
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and choices and embedded in the sui generis character of particular
national societies, is simply beyond the purview of private, contractual justice. Until sovereign states agree through the framework of an
international treaty either that international arbitrators have expanded
subject matter jurisdiction or provide for truly international regulatory laws (relating to antitrust, securities transactions, corporate bribery, or RICO-like problems), national courts should retain exclusive
jurisdiction over matters that trigger bona fide claims based upon the
provisions of national regulatory law. Otherwise, international arbitrators would be not only the architects of a new law merchant, but a
self-appointed and unaccountable community of international legislators.
VII.

A FINAL RECOMMENDATION

The U.S. Supreme Court has advocated for a wide concept of arbitrability, making essentially all claims arising in the context of an
5
The Court has also advocated
international transaction arbitrable1.
for court supervision of the arbitral resolution of statutory claims at
the enforcement stage of the award.5 2 The second-look doctrine,53 articulated by the Court, is dysfunctional in the context of international
arbitration for a number of reasons. First, it provides national judicial
scrutiny of statutory claims arising under national law by pure happenstance. The assets of the award-debtor whose statutory claim was
misconstrued, discounted, or eliminated by the arbitral tribunal, may
not be located in the country of the law giving rise to the claim. Further, the doctrine assumes the arbitration will proceed to finality and
will then be challenged by the relevant party.
Second, if judicial supervision is available and forthcoming, its exercise at this late stage of the arbitral process is likely to render it
unrigorous and fairly meaningless. Courts are not likely to overturn
an adjudication that is basically concluded. Third, the Court's secondlook doctrine amounts to a merits review of those aspects of the
award that deal with statutory claims. The prospect of any judicial
supervision of the merits of arbitral awards is manifestly against the
spirit and letter of the New York Convention and the modern development of international commercial arbitration. It amounts to recom-

51. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
52. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
53. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court:A Pleafor Statutory
Reform, 5 00no ST. J. oN Disp. RESOL. 231, 269-272 (1990).
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mending an untoward judicial intrusion that clearly undermines the
autonomy of the arbitral process. Finally, it is unlikely the Court's
suggestion of a second-look doctrine was intended as a serious solution to the Court's evisceration of the inarbitrability defense and the
concomitant demise of national law in international commercial arbito allay concern
tration. Rather, it was integrated into the opinion
54
about the consequences of the Court's ruling.
A more feasible means of achieving a necessary balance between the
autonomy of arbitration and the integrity of national law is to institute a certification procedure between arbitral tribunals and national
courts when the arbitral tribunal determines a legitimate claim has
been stated under national statutory law and is material to its ruling
on the contract claims. Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal could request the national court to rule on whether a valid statutory claim has
been raised under the applicable law. This eliminates the criticism that
parties could raise false statutory claims in a dilatory end simply to
frustrate the recourse to arbitration and complicate the adjudication.
When a valid statutory claim is raised, the matter should be referred
to the national court and the arbitral tribunal should evaluate the impact of the reference upon the adjudication of the contractual claims.
The certification of statutory claims to national courts by international arbitral tribunals would avoid the destructive consequences
upon national sovereign authority. It also would further the spirit of
mutuality between national law and the international arbitral process
that has been at the heart of the arbitral process' success and legitimacy. A certification procedure would establish a type of federalism
relationship between the state judicial process and the international
arbitral process. This procedure, akin to the one existing between state
and federal courts, would simultaneously maintain the autonomy of
the arbitral process and the legitimate position of national sovereigns.
Also, it would have the considerable benefit of attributing clear definition to the jurisdictional mandate of international arbitrators and
maintaining the private, consensual, and fundamentally contractual
character of arbitral adjudication.
VIII.

ACTUAL PRACTICE

A few of the reported or summarized ICC awards focus upon the

question of arbitrability. 55 The general rule in these awards does not
54. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The ExuberantPathway to Quixotic Internationalism:Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAr. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 265, 284-285 (1986).
See, e.g., Editrice Giochi Srl (Italy) v. CTG Products Corp. (U.S.A.), Int'l Comm.
55.
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exhibit a high level of sophistication in dealing with the arbitrability
of disputes. The consideration appears to center upon elaborating a
few reasons to justify the foregone conclusion of arbitral jurisdiction
because to determine otherwise would impair the autonomy of arbitration. According to the leading treatise on ICC arbitration, 6 a trend
exists among ICC awards holding that arbitrators can maintain their
jurisdiction when one of the parties argues that the transaction violates a public policy provision of national law or of an international
treaty. The reason advanced in the awards is that the arbitrator's contractual jurisdiction remains intact to resolve the consequences of an
alleged public policy violation.5 7 A negative ruling here, it is alleged,
would imperil the efficacy of the arbitral clause, be contrary to good
faith bargaining in some instances, and might violate the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. According to these awards, the national interest
asserted through regulatory law is sufficiently protected by the limited
right of review afforded to national courts under the New York Convention. These rulings have surfaced in awards dealing with state concession contracts over natural resources,5" bankruptcy, 9 and the
application of EEC anti-competition law.60
Like the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, these determinations
exhibit a pathological concern for the frailty of arbitral jurisdiction
and of the institution of arbitral adjudication. The slightest deviation
from an unyielding, absolute, and exclusive reference to arbitration
perforce will result in the entire dismantling of the arbitral process.
Accordingly, the reach of national law must always succumb to the
hegemony of the arbitral institution and the arbitral jurisdictional
mandate. In the context of a public policy allegation, arbitrators (to
reinforce this position) have attempted to draw an elusive distinction
between the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration (regulated by
contract) and the rules to be applied in the resolution of disputes that
attend the contract (always falling within the arbitrator's discretion).
Following this reasoning, it appears that all disputes become arbitrable once the parties have agreed to arbitrate (even before the content

Arb. Binder ** bk. 1 IA at 8 (W. Laurence Craig, et al. eds., 1986); French Construction Consortium v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Int'l Comm. Arb. Binder ** bk. 1IA at 11; see
also REcuBIL DES SENTENCES DE LA CCI [Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards] 217-224, 341-346,
530-536 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990); 8 Icc Y.B. COM. ARB. 94-117 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1983).
56. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., ICC ARImTAION (2d ed. 1990).
57. Id. at 86-91.
58. See Ice Y.B. CoM. ARB., supra note 55, at 89.
59. See REcUBIL DEs SENTNCES ARBITRALES DE LA Cci, supra note 55, at 530.
60. Id. at 341.
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of any dispute is known). National courts have rarely been so extravagant in deciding the reach of their own authority. One arbitrator, ruling on the issue of arbitrability in the context of EEC anti-competition
law, did, however, make the sensible suggestion that such matters
should be submitted as an interlocutory question to the European
to allow for uniform interpretation and apCourt of Justice in order
61
plication of the law.
Most of the available ICC arbitral rulings on arbitrability have been
rendered in the context of state concession agreements, bankruptcy,
and anti-competition law. These issues typically arise in the setting of
commercial transactions and involve legal dispositions and processes
which are familiar to commercial parties and lawyers. Allowing sovereign parties to abrogate contracts at will, upon a change of government or of the economic climate, is obviously antithetical to the
interests of international commerce. Moreover, the law of the state in
question can hardly be deemed an acceptable predicate by which to
assess the rights and obligations of the parties. In this setting, the arbitral tribunal is the purveyor of an objective and disinterested commercial and legal perspective. Filing for bankruptcy, like alleging that
the transaction violates anti-competition law, can be a relatively facile
way of attempting to frustrate the exercise of the arbitral mandate and
to avoid or postpone the day of reckoning. In a similar vein, the
shield of bankruptcy in domestic American law has become, in some
sense, the most effective defense to strict product liability of enterprises.
When the objective of the legal procedure appears dilatory, a part
of purely litigious strategy, it is appropriate to favor and protect the
institutional integrity of arbitration and allow the arbitrator to rule
upon the subsidiary consequences of a possible statutory violation.
Trustees in bankruptcy can join the arbitral proceeding and perform
their function of protecting the interests of creditors during the proceeding. The tribunal can receive and assess the evidence in regard to
violations of anti-competition law.
When the statutory claim appears well-founded and not part of a
litigious strategy, less justification exists to allow the arbitrators to
rule on the statutory claim. Assuming the national law governs, the
arbitrators have little expertise to justify their jurisdiction. Moreover,
the issue is one of public law, affecting the interests of third parties
and society at large. The arbitrators are neither invested with authority to rule nor accountable for their rulings. In the private setting of

61.

Id. at 342.
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arbitration, an additional concern exists for uniformity of interpretation and the evasion of national law. Awards often go unreported or
are available only in summary. The point is that statutory law is outside the province of arbitration. A legitimate statutory controversy
must result in a stay of the arbitral proceeding and a reference to national courts. Such a result would not hinder or demean the contractual authority of the tribunal.
Therefore, instead of simply having arbitrators declare in every instance that they have jurisdiction to rule on all issues no matter what
their character, we propose that arbitrators should engage in a "first
look" of the statutory claims presented. When national regulatory law
is properly invoked and material to the resolution of the contractual
claims, the tribunal should stay the proceeding or submit these claims
during a preliminary phase to a national court for an advisory ruling
or disposition of the matter. To avoid making this procedure an opportunity for dilatory tactics, the tribunal could be authorized by the
governing institutional rules or by the agreement of the parties or by a
"common law" arbitral precept to sanction the making of a frivolous
statutory claim with the imposition of damages. Such conduct would
be in violation of the duty to arbitrate in good faith and the damage
award would correspond to the federal court practice of imposing
Rule 1162 sanctions for frivolous appeals against arbitral awards. Such
a procedure could only enhance the legitimacy of international arbitration and its complementary relationship with national judicial tribunals.

IX.

RESOLUTION OF TAx IssuEs

In particular, the resolution of statutory claims involving tax issues
is unsuitable for arbitral determination. Of the statutory issues that
can surface in the context of a commercial transaction (antitrust,
bankruptcy, etc.), it is the least susceptible to resolution by reference
to commercial good sense. Basic familiarity with tax regulations reveals such regulations and the problems they raise have a truly sui
generis character. The resolution of tax problems is a specialty. Often,
the provisions of the tax laws are ambiguous; it is always a challenge
to determine even whether they apply. The content of the provisions
usually gain real meaning only in the context of the IRS process. Tax
disputes involve the exercise of discretion by a variety of individuals
and the operation of a number of processes: in addition to the parties
themselves, an auditor, a supervisor, the recourse to an internal settle62.

FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
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ment process, and finally an appeal to the tax courts. It would be
foolhardy to maintain that any non-specialist could determine the
content and application of the relevant tax laws.
Therefore, an intimate professional acquaintance with the content
of U.S. tax laws is not required to conclude that the question of the
applicability of relevant tax provisions on withholding tax from the
payments made under an international contract raises the type of interpretative problems that are completely inapposite for submission to
the commercial and juridical expertise of international commercial arbitrators. Even assuming regulatory claims pertaining to antitrust, securities, RICO, or bankruptcy laws are arbitrable, none of these laws
depends upon an administrative agency akin to the IRS for their implementation or definition. Not only is the content of tax law unusually complex, but the process designed to give practical content and
implementation to the regulatory provisions is also intricate, complicated, and elusive to the dictates of common sense. The individual
discretion of members of this vast bureaucracy often lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results. Supervisors are not bound by the determinations of the initial auditors, and the parties may reach yet
another result through a settlement conference prior to appeal to tax
court. The agency can take the position that each tax case or problem
is sui generis and commands a singular interpretation of the law.
Therefore, there may be little room for predictable outcomes and accurate prophecies of potential tax liability outside the perimeters of
the IRS.
The facts of the hypothetical case present an additional complication in light of the international character of the transaction and the
foreign nationality of some of the implicated companies. Presumably,
this is not the usual fare of the IRS's supervision of the tax consequences of business conduct. For example, in the circumstances of the
case, the IRS must determine whether the royalty payments were subject to the newly-imposed tax. The applicable provisions may be far
from clear. To the extent the character of the parties' relationship
raises a res nova for tax purposes, the ambiguity of the law will be
exacerbated, making the IRS bureaucracy and the attendant appeals
procedure the sole mechanism for achieving a certain result as to tax
liability.
An arbitral award ruling on this matter would certainly not be binding upon the IRS in subsequent similar disputes and might not resolve
the tax liability issue that divides the parties. Because the IRS and the
appellate court process have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the application of tax provisions to individual cases, a determination of a
tax issue by a private, non-national adjudicatory body can only be
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binding on the arbitrating parties. A valid arbitral award can be rendered enforceable by judicial judgement; to that extent, the arbitral
determination of the tax liability issue may be binding upon the IRS.
However, in this regard the award is likely to be challenged by one of
the parties or the IRS under Article V of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention on the basis of inarbitrability, violation of U.S. public policy, and/or excess of arbitral authority. The award could also
be subject to the "second-look" doctrine as to its ruling on the issue,
thereby making it subject to a merits review by the U.S. courts. This
result would not only confound the attempt to resolve the dispute,
and threaten the legitimacy of the award, but it would also create a
jurisdictional conflict between the IRS and the process of international arbitration. These complications and destructive conflicts could
be avoided simply by an advisory reference to the IRS or a tax court
3
at a preliminary stage of the arbitral proceeding.
Finally, in the hypothetical case, an undeniable duplication of issues
exists between the action brought before the federal district court in
New Jersey and the issues submitted to the arbitral tribunal. If part of
the basic purpose for submission to arbitration is to achieve efficiency
and expertise in international commercial adjudication, neither rationale of the arbitral process is served in these circumstances. The federal court has jurisdiction over a case involving basically identical
issues arising from an integrated commercial transaction between corporate parties. Moreover, these issues require a national court's particular and special expertise. There must be some value for
international commercial parties to engage in an efficient and competent adjudication of claims before the court.
X.

CONCLUSION

The recommended solution corresponds to the determination
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.64 In this
case, the Court allowed a stay of an arbitral proceeding on the basis
of a provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure meant to
avoid duplicative proceedings.
Allowing a U.S. federal tribunal to decide the matter of tax liability
would be efficient and sensible, and would reflect a judicious appraisal of the issues involved. It also would act as a source for giving

63. See Anon, Arbitrationfor Apple, in NAT'L L. J., Mar. 23, 1992, at 17. In this case,
however, the Internal Revenue Service was a party to the dispute and decided, in this circumstance, to delegate its jurisdictional authority to an agreed-upon arbitral tribunal.
64. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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renewed and necessary meaning to the inarbitrability defense under
U.S. law and international commercial practice.

